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INTRODUCTION

The discipline of comparative constitutional law today is focused in
significant part on the study of how and why judges use foreign precedent.1
Scholars debate the propriety of using foreign precedent as “authority,” 2
circumstances under which such use is consistent with democracy (or a product
of democratization),3 and which constitutional traditions may derive the
greatest benefit from comparison.4 While comparative law theorists have long
reflected on, and struggled with, a standard disciplinary vocabulary to describe
what judges do when they engage in “comparative constitutional law,” the
1

See generally VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL
ERA 1 (2010) [hereinafter JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT] (reviewing recent
legislative attempts to both restrict judicial borrowing and to expand it, as well as to identify
the focus on judicial constitutional interpretation); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT
NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 23 (2005);
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L
L. 57 (2004); Andrew R. Dennington, We Are the World?: Justifying the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Use of Contemporary Foreign Legal Practice in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper, 29 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 269 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 56 (2004); David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global
Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523 (2011); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already
Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 40; Michael D. Ramsey, International
Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69
(2004); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2009); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less
Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to
Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006); Melissa A. Waters, Getting Beyond the
Crossfire Phenomenon: A Militant Moderate’s Take on the Role of Foreign Authority in
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 635 (2008).
The focus on judicial behavior is just that—a focus. Scholars are increasingly examining
other types of constitutional convergence and divergence accomplished through comparison.
See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 399, 422 (2011) (warning against overreliance on anecdotal evidence in the
comparative constitutional context); Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643 (2011) (comparing the relative difficulty of constitutional amendment
processes). Certainly, in the past, scholars have focused on constitutional borrowing as part of
the constitutional drafting or institutional design processes following decolonization or after
the fall of the Berlin Wall. See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and
Nonborrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 196, 196–98 (2003).
2
See e.g., JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1 (noting legislatures,
including the U.S. Congress, that have attempted to restrict judicial borrowing); Frederick
Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931 (2008).
3
See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2005); Rosalind Dixon,
A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 947, 948–49 (2008);
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 40 (1998).
4
See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 639 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the
U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson,
Transnational Discourse].
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existing scholarship generally distributes judges’ use of foreign precedent into
one of three modes of comparative adjudication.5 First, courts use foreign
precedent to identify “universal” principles of law applicable across
jurisdictions. Second, courts sharpen understanding of domestic law through
contrasting foreign judgments. Third, courts use foreign authority to identify,
then choose, constitutionally permissible options to solve jurisprudential or
policy problems.6 These theories have a methodological approach in common:
scholars analyze the treatment given certain foreign decisions and sort the
cases into one category or another.7
This Article is in part an effort to consolidate these descriptive
categories.8 It is also aimed at building the body of scholarship devoted to
constitutional borrowing as an activity undertaken by constitutional courts as
part of their political competition with legislatures and executives.
Specifically, judges may borrow from each other not only or even mostly in
order to shed light on a constitutional dispute but rather to mutually reinforce
the political authority of each to render orders, which scale back executive or
legislative prerogatives. By “constitutional borrowing”, I mean specifically
judges’ consideration of decisions reached by judges in foreign jurisdictions in
contrast to borrowing in the wider context of constitutional drafting or
institutional design.9
Political scientists, of course, have long studied judiciaries as political
actors whose incentive to compete or collaborate with other actors is shaped by
a number of cultural, political, economic, and social factors.10 Judicial review
5

See Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of
Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 301 (2004); Dixon, supra note 3,
at 948–49; Igor Stramignoni, The King’s One Too Many Eyes: Language, Thought, and
Comparative Law, 2 UTAH L. REV. 739, 740–41 (2002); Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law
as Comparative Jurisprudence—The Comparability of Legal Systems, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 713,
715 (2004).
6
See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).
7
JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 9; Christopher McCrudden,
A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional
Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 516–27 (2000); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, A Tool,
Not a Master: The Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. POL.
STUD. 1188 (2001). The terminology differs, but the principles share basic analytic features.
For example, Mark Tushnet may refer to the same process that a court undertakes in
considering foreign precedent as “functional”, whereas Sujit Choudhry might call it
“dialogical” and Roger Alford may say “pragmatic”. In her recent and comprehensive work
on the issue, Vicki Jackson refers to courts’ use of foreign precedent as “convergence”,
“resistance”, and “engagement”, where “convergence” roughly approximates “universalism”,
whereas “resistance” and “engagement” correspond to variations on what Choudhry refers to
as “dialogical” or “genealogical” modes of constitutional interpretation.
8
See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 4 (2d. ed. 2009) (noting the importance of comparative
law for creating a common vocabulary and analytical method).
9
See Epstein & Knight, supra note 1.
10
See generally INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan eds.,
2005) [hereinafter GINSBURG & KAGAN]; RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE
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occupies a prominent role in this literature, as it brings into sharpest focus the
assertion of judicial power, especially over elected and thus theoretically more
legitimate actors, such as legislatures. Judicial review, of course, is not a
court’s only means of asserting claims to political authority. 11 So, on the one
hand, there is a rich literature authored principally by legal scholars studying
the ways in which courts use foreign precedent to interpret constitutions and
statutes.12 On the other hand, there is a similarly large effort undertaken to
understand courts’ political power relative to legislatures and executives.13
Legal scholars and political scientists have paid less attention to finding cases
where both of these behaviors—the jurisprudential and the political—might be
tested. This Article presents one such effort.
This Article applies existing theories of comparative constitutional
interpretation14 to the Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Shri D.K. Basu v.
State of West Bengal (D.K. Basu), confirming and expanding basic rights
attaching to arrest and detention and compensatory remedies for violations of
those rights.15
Drawing on constitutional precedent from the United
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 12–13 (2004); Martin
Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review and Democracy, in ON LAW, POLITICS AND
JUDICIALIZATION 149 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002); David Landau,
Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 319 (2010).
11
See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: StrongForm Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 393 (2007)
(arguing for a “commitment to constitutional ‘dialogue’ as the most desirable model of
cooperation between courts and legislatures in the enforcement of socioeconomic rights”);
David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624, 633–34 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (noting
alternative means by which constitutional courts acquire or cede power relative to other
branches).
12
See, e.g., NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1087–90 (2002). See also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Willingness to consider foreign judicial views in
comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a ‘decent respect to
the opinions of mankind.’”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (foreign material “may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem . . . .”); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,
710 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt,
Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282
(1999) (alteration in original) (“[C]omparative analysis emphatically is relevant
to . . . interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights.”); Stephen Breyer, Keynote
Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003).
13
See GINSBURG & KAGAN, supra note 10; Shapiro, supra note 10; Landau, supra note
10.
14
Choudhry, supra note 6.
15
Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 416 (India).
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Kingdom,16 the United States,17 Ireland,18 Trinidad and Tobago,19 and New
Zealand,20 the Supreme Court of India elaborated the procedural framework to
protect the rights of those arrested and detained from police abuse. Generally
celebrated as an exercise in comparative constitutional law, but rarely analyzed
with any detail, the case is particularly useful because of the numerous sources
of authority to which it refers to support a similarly large number of
conclusions as to India’s constitutional principles.21 The Court fashioned its
judgment so as to enhance its authority via the constitutional guarantee to the
right to life—which the Supreme Court of India has generally used to order the
enforcement of otherwise non-judiciable social and economic rights—as well
as to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity for damages sustained as a result of
abuse, injury, or death in police custody.22 The judgment also weighed foreign
approaches to the measure and limits of money damages awarded as
compensation. In relying on foreign authority, the Supreme Court of India also
emphasized its political role, expanding its oversight over police practices and
vesting itself with the right to order money damages notwithstanding explicit
acknowledgment that neither the constitution nor parliament had authorized it
to do so. The case, therefore, usefully tests whether existing theories
adequately describe the process of comparative constitutional interpretation as
well as exploring whether constitutional borrowing plays a role in
constitutional courts’ claim to political authority.23

16

Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18
The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan, [1965] I.R. 70, 122 (Ir.); Byrne v.
Ireland, [1972] I.R. 241 (Ir.).
19
Maharaj v. Att’y Gen. of Trin. & Tobago, [1979] A.C. 385.
20
Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA).
21
See, e.g., Surya Deva, Human Rights Realization in an Era of Globalization: The Indian
Experience, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 98 n.32 (2006); Jackson, Transnational
Discourse, supra note 4, at 293–94 n.84 (2003); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause
and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 575, 604 n.181 (2006); Luzius Wildhaber,
The European Court of Human Rights: The Past, The Present, The Future, 22 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 521, 537 n.88 (2007).
22
Abhishek Singhvi, India’s Constitution and Individual Rights: Diverse Perspectives, 41
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 327, 344–45 (2009) (citations omitted) (“Thus, Article 21 has been
invoked in various civil and political rights cases, including pretrial release on bail bond,
speedy trial for child offenders, award of compensation in public law writ jurisdiction,
prohibition of cruel punishment, custodial excesses and deaths, delayed criminal trials, the
requirements of a fair trial, and so forth. It also has been invoked for broader issues, such as
housing atomically active substances, the validity of beauty contests involving derogatory
representation of women, environmental jurisprudence (including the Public Trust doctrine, the
’Precautionary Principle,’ and the right to clean air and water), the right to health, housing,
livelihood, and so forth.”).
23
See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 2 (2003) (“This tension is particularly apparent where
constitutionalism is safeguarded through judicial review. One government body, unelected by
the people, tells an elected body that its will is incompatible with the fundamental aspirations
of the people.”); HIRSCHL, supra note 10, at 12–13 (using the examples of Canada, Israel, New
17
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A focus on D.K. Basu is especially warranted given the regard with
which that case—and more broadly the Supreme Court of India—is held by
prominent jurists, comparative law scholars, and constitutional advocates.
Luzius Wildhaber, former President of the European Court of Human Rights,
in a speech delivered to the British Institute of Human Rights emphasizing the
role of courts in providing an effective control over executive authorities,
quoted D.K. Basu for the principle that “[t]he State must, therefore, ensure that
various agencies deployed by it for combating terrorism act within the bounds
of law and not become law unto themselves.”24 Bas de Gaay Fortman praises
D.K. Basu for the independence and creativity exercised by the Supreme Court
of India in fashioning procedural protections for detainees.25 Vicki Jackson
cited D.K. Basu as part of the Supreme Court of India’s general willingness to
use international law and foreign precedent to inform constitutional meaning.26
Indeed, the Supreme Court of India occupies a prominent place in the
field of comparative constitutional law generally. More thoroughly detailed
below, the Constitution of India drew upon the growing body of international
human rights law as well as American, Australian, British, Canadian, German,
and Irish constitutional features and provisions.27 The Supreme Court of India
has therefore freely referred to foreign constitutional courts’ precedent from its
inception.28 Together with the constitutional courts of South Africa and
Germany, the Supreme Court of India’s jurisprudence “features prominently in
the comparative law literature” both because of its constitutional history and
because of its “strong commitment to democracy and rule of law in the face of
significant developmental challenges and internal conflict and, in more recent
decades, the activist approach of Indian courts to the enforcement of positive
rights.”29 Because India both borrows and donates seminal constitutional
decisions, it is a useful example through which to study constitutional courts’
borrowing more generally. It is, of course, important to note that the Supreme
Zealand, and South Africa to explore the institutional incentives constitutional courts have to
transfer authority from decision-making majoritarian bodies like legislatures to judiciaries).
24
Luzius Wildhaber, President, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Human Rights and
Democracy 13 (Nov. 22, 2001), available at http://www.bihr.org.uk/sites/default/files/
wildhaber-transcript.pdf.
25
See Bas de Gaay Fortman, ‘Adventurous’ Judgments: A Comparative Exploration into
Human Rights as a Moral-Political Force in Judicial Law Development, 2 UTRECHT L. REV.
22, 34 (2006), available at http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/viewFile/
24/24.
26
Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 4, at 294 n.84.
27
See generally Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 476
(2003) (detailing the origins and influences of both India’s constitutional text and its
constitutional court).
28
Sujit Choudhry, How to Do Comparative Constitutional Law in India: Naz Foundation,
Same Sex Rights, and Dialogical Interpretation, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
SOUTH ASIA 45, 53 (Sunil Khilnani, Vikram Raghavan & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2013)
(citing Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic
Jurisprudence: The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218 (2006)).
29
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 829–30 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
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Court of India explicitly places itself within a large but discrete community of
common law courts. Constitutional courts in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, for
example, practice “scarce engagement in explicit comparative analysis.”30
Even within the common law judicial community, not all courts participate in
borrowing foreign precedent as robustly. Thus, although D.K. Basu is
significant both for its individual importance and the practice of the Supreme
Court of India generally, it is worth noting potential limits on its applicability
to the conduct of constitutional courts, especially those outside the common
law tradition.
Nevertheless, the basic conclusion provided herein is that there is some
evidence that constitutional courts are forging a separate epistemic community,
an independent source of political authority outside the constituent nations
from which the judges decide.31 This community transcends the kind of
“conferencing”, “dialogue”, or “engagement” fora advocated by specific treaty
bodies, legal scholars, and individual jurists.32 In short, while constitutional
30

Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1165, 1176 (Michel
Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
31
See Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 4, at 283 (citations omitted)
(“References to transnational sources may relate not only to the place of the court’s nation in
the community of nations, but also to the status and relationship of courts to each other in the
development of law, thus fostering an autonomous professionalism of independent courts (to
which end the display of knowledge alone may have some perceived value) and/or the
autonomous content of law under the interpretive control of judges. Recognizing the dignity
and authority of other decision-makers may add to their legitimacy within their own legal
orders, or confer it on others.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “I’d Like to Teach the World to
Sing (In Perfect Harmony)”: International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses—Reflections on
the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321,
1325 (2006) (“The conversations plainly enhanced mutual understanding of how foreign
constitutional courts function, the role that the courts play in domestic government, and the
problems that the various courts confront in going about their job of safeguarding
constitutional values. At the same time, however, this lack of knowledge has rather serious
implications for advocates of the strong form of IJD: how can one reliably “borrow” a
precedent when one lacks even the most rudimentary understanding of the institution that
issued the opinion and the legal, social, and cultural constraints that provided the context for
the decision? A precedent is more than bare words on a page. A precedent is the product of a
socio-legal culture: reading a text as nothing more than a text risks grave misunderstandings
that could prove embarrassing to the borrowing court.”).
32
See, e.g., Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring
Adherence to Shari‘a Threaten Human Rights?: How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles
Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 411–12 (2006). See
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (“Like the phrase ‘regularly constituted
court,’ [widely accepted judicial guarantees are] not defined in the text of the Geneva
Conventions but must be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections
that have been recognized by customary international law.”); Sam Foster Halabi, The World
Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Guidelines
Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 121 (2010) (describing
the Bangalore Principles by which common law judges use principles of international law to
fill in gaps in national law); Sam Foster Halabi, The Supremacy Clause as Structural
Safeguard of Federalism: State Judges and International Law in the Post-Erie Era, 23 DUKE J.
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courts do engage with foreign law in the ways described by prominent
comparative law scholars, they also appear to be forging a body of judge-made
law which relies upon mutual reference for legitimacy.33
In D.K. Basu, Justice A.S. Anand of India and Justice Michael Hardie
Boys of New Zealand appear to complete a jurisprudential cycle whereby one
judge establishes a right or set of rights which is then authorized by a second
judicial body whose decision is then recycled back as authority in the original
issuing court (and, in the case of D.K. Basu, by the same authoring judge).
Given courts’ “central role in legitimizing and validating the exercise of public
power” and their “obligation to engage in a process of justification for their
own decisions” it is important to understand whether they are acting in a
national or transnational capacity.34
The concern among critics of constitutional borrowing has been that
judges will “cherry pick” foreign precedent to lead to a preferred outcome in a
given case. What scholars have paid less attention to is that a judge may use
foreign precedent as part of building a global body of legal authority
supporting not only mutual recognition of interpretive principles but also
structural authority like the remedial powers that national courts enjoy relative
to national legislatures or sub-national actors, such as provinces or states. This
possibility is not well-accommodated by existing theories articulated by legal
scholars, but it contributes to the effort undertaken by political scientists to
understand the exercise of the judicial power as part of a competitive
institutional dynamic among legislative, executive, and judicial authorities.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: Part II reviews
existing theories and terminology describing theories of comparative
constitutional interpretation, briefly summarizing their features and use in
constitutional court reasoning. Part III presents the factual and procedural
background of D.K. Basu, sketching the prevalence of death and torture in
police detention, the relevant Indian custody jurisprudence, and the use made
by the Court of precedents and reasoning from foreign jurisdictions. Part IV
more thoroughly develops comparative constitutional theory as applied to the
case of D.K. Basu, weighing the relevant theories and assessing whether those
theories usefully describe the Court’s borrowing behavior. Part V presents the

COMP. & INT’L L. 63 (2012) (noting judicial conferencing recommended under the Hague
Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (discussing
alternative forms of transnational judicial dialogue and the importance of such dialogue to the
judiciary as an institution. Justice Anand’s judgment in D.K. Basu is a good example of the
latter.).
33
As many scholars have argued, the relationship between courts and executives or
legislatures need not be absolute. Courts may engage in “dialogic” judicial review, for
example, inviting executive or legislative action through their decisions. See Rosalind Dixon,
The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 235,
238–39 (2009).
34
Choudhry, supra note 6, at 885.
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conclusions of the case that may aid in our understanding of the complex use
that constitutional courts make of foreign judgments and reasoning.
II.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: UNIVERSALISM, EXPRESSIVISM, AND PRAGMATISM

The field of comparative constitutional law has not yet developed a
standardized terminology for descriptions of what courts do when they borrow
or refer to foreign precedent. For example, in his seminal exploration of the
field, Mark Tushnet referred to “functionalism”, “expressivism”, and
“bricolage” to describe the comparative constitutional adjudicative process.35
Functionalist approaches to constitutional comparativism acknowledge that
certain constitutional provisions are meant to secure a particular form of
governance, and judges are able to discover which constitutional provisions
serve those underlying purposes through comparison and contrast between
constitutional structures. “Expressivism” describes comparisons undertaken to
ascertain the extent to which constitutions represent underlying national
cultures and experiences and how those experiences manifest through
constitutional interpretation.36 “Bricolage” posits that constitutions are often
assembled from borrowed ideas that, in turn, justify reference to those
borrowed ideas as a constitutional experience unfolds.37
Sujit Choudhry contemporaneously offered a comprehensive
classification scheme for judicial borrowing, referring to “universal”,
“dialogical”, and “genealogical” interpretation.38 “Universalism” refers to the
effort by jurists to discover broadly applicable principles underlying
constitutional concepts, such as the state’s ability to deprive a citizen of his or
her liberty or life.39
“Dialogical” interpretation is used to explore

35

Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 22–26 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Choudhry,
supra note 6, at 835–38; Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999).
36
Tushnet, supra note 35, at 1276–78. Tushnet cites American tolerance of hate speech as
traceable to a constitutional commitment to “the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” where other national experiences, Germany’s, for
example, justify greater flexibility for law-makers to restrict speech aimed at inciting ethnic or
religious hatred. Id. at 1276 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
37
Id. at 1285–87. See also Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of
Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom,
58 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 595 n.40 (2010) (citing Tushnet, supra note 35) (performing “analysis
of the viability of constitutional transplants; attitudes including functionalism (consideration of
suitability of the adoption of a rule through the assessment of the functions its [sic] fills in the
home system and the parallel functions in the receiving system), expressivism (careful
treatment of constitutions, being expressions of national credos), and bricolage (assembly of
any available rule, essentially undiscriminately)”).
38
See Choudhry, supra note 6.
39
Id. at 833.
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constitutional differences of significant, if not universal, import.40 For
example, the use of race-based criteria for employment or university
admissions plays a unique constitutional role in both the United States and
South Africa given the relationship between their historical experiences and
constitutional provisions regarding equality and due process.41 “Dialogical”
comparative constitutionalism allows judges in these jurisdictions and others to
examine how their particular experience does or should shape the
constitutional rights of individuals or the validity of public law measures aimed
at addressing past inequities.
“Genealogical” forms of comparative
constitutional adjudication examine constitutional provisions in light of their
source.42 For Choudhry, this matters because many constitutions, especially
those drafted under or influenced by British colonial institutions, contain
provisions reflecting at least one and often many more constitutional
experiences.43
In her comprehensive treatment of comparative constitutional
jurisprudence, Vicki Jackson similarly classified constitutional borrowing into
a spectrum comprised of “convergence”, “resistance”, and “engagement.” 44
Like Choudhry’s universalism, Jackson’s “convergence” occurs when one
constitutional court adopts another constitutional court’s interpretation or
reasoning based either 1) on the relationship between a greater number of
courts adopting it and the chance that it is correct or 2) on its consistency with
international legal norms embodied in, for example, international human rights
instruments. Courts resist foreign precedent because reference to other
constitutional courts threatens the cultural or national distinctiveness embodied
in a constitution, undermines certain interpretive theories like originalism and
textualism, and compounds the already existing democratic tension inherent in
the power of judicial review.45 “Engagement”, which essentially covers
possibilities between convergence and resistance, is “founded on commitments
to judicial deliberation and open to the possibilities of either harmony or
dissonance between national self-understandings and transnational norms.”46
40

Id. at 835–36.
Id. at 836 n.70.
42
Id. at 838.
43
See id. at 838 n.81.
44
JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 17–23.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 9. “Sujit Choudhry’s ‘dialogical’ stance corresponds to Jackson's ‘engagement’”
and “analysis of possible approaches to the reception of foreign law.” Cohn, supra note 37, at
595 n.40 (citing JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1; Choudhry, supra
note 6, at 835–38; Choudhry, supra note 35, at 1, 22–26). “Attitudes includ[e] convergence
(adoption, based on the assumption of the desirability of convergence with, if not incorporation
of, foreign and international norms); resistance (rejection, expressed for example in American
exceptionalism); and engagement (a practice of informed consideration prior to possible
adoption, under which transnational law is considered a possible, but not controlling, form of
legal development).” Cohn, supra note 37, at 595 n.40 (citing JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1). See also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005).
41
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Roger Alford contextualizes comparative constitutional adjudication
through underlying interpretive theories—originalism, natural law,
majoritarianism, and pragmatism—which similarly categorize judges’ use of
foreign precedent in constitutional cases.47 Alford evaluates the relative merit
of constitutional borrowing through these interpretive theories although they
similarly reflect concepts embodied in Choudhry’s “universalism” (natural
law), Jackson’s “resistance” (originalism), and Tushnet’s “functionalism” and
“bricolage” (pragmatism). There are, of course, other classifying schemes,
each of which emphasizes certain normative or empirical problems that
accompany the study of courts’ use of foreign precedent. Taavi Annus
summarized the state of the field this way:
Attempts to categorize uses of comparative law by courts are
numerous. Although most authors claim that there are three
uses of comparative constitutional law, there is a general lack of
coherency
among
these
classifications.
For
example, Tushnet discusses functionalism, expressivism, and
bricolage. Choudhry contends that there are three modes of
comparative constitutional interpretation:
universalist,
dialogical, and genealogical. . . . Another way of seeing the use
of comparative law is to differentiate between defining and
justifying relevant issues and clarifying the reasoning behind
comparative analysis in moral and policy balancing. One can
refer to ‘evaluative,’ ‘intentionalist,’ ‘textualist,’ and ‘authoritybased’ comparisons. One might also distinguish between
‘necessary’ and voluntary,’ between genealogical’ and
‘ahistorical,’ and between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ recourses to
comparative law. . . . The court may use comparative law in
order to ‘find a solution’ or ‘justify a solution,’ as well as for
the purpose of ‘internal utility’ or ‘external legitimacy.’ The
comparison may be ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal.’ Alternatively, one
might distinguish between the ‘general and indirect,’ as opposed
to ‘specific and direct,’ influence of comparative constitutional
materials, as well as between explicit and non-explicit uses of
comparative constitutional law.48
As this passage hints, the field of comparative constitutional law is tilted
toward the classificatory. Courts borrow or resist borrowing in one of several
“modes”, “postures”, or “methods.” Use of foreign materials is similarly
ascribed to the nature or function of the original source or the parallel
structures or principles to which they are applied.
Describing with accuracy the constitutional borrowing phenomena is an
important part of understanding judicial behavior as the “global community of
47
48

Alford, supra note 4.
Annus, supra note 5, at 307–08 (citations omitted).
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courts” grows more tightly knit.49 But the more fundamental relationship at
stake in the comparative constitutional law debate is the relationship between
judicial power and democratic legitimacy.
Indeed, the fundamental controversy, as Alford, Jackson, Tushnet,
Choudhry, and, it is fair to say, most scholars who have weighed in on the
debate have identified, is whether resort to comparative constitutional
precedent is consistent with republican democratic principles. This is the
distinction that Mary Ann Glendon draws, for example, in claiming that use of
foreign precedent is legitimate where it is used to affirm executive or
legislative measures but not legitimate where it is used to invalidate them.50
The question is whether, as proponents argue, comparative constitutional
jurisprudence provides yet another body of persuasive authority that poses no
more of a threat than a court’s use of a law review article or whether, as critics
argue, constitutional borrowing has fundamental institutional consequences
that are inconsistent with conventional notions of democracy.51
Comprehensive surveys of foreign borrowing and descriptive
classification are less likely to focus on that question than analyzing whether
any given episode of borrowing enhances judicial authority. In order to
explore this latter question, I searched for a case in which a constitutional court
applied numerous sources of foreign constitutional precedent to support a wide
range of constitutional conclusions, both to explore the robustness of existing
classifications as well as to explore whether constitutional borrowing presents
independent manifestations of the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”52 At the
risk of oversimplifying these theories, I have labeled them “universalism”,
“expressivism”, and “pragmatism”, folding in Jackson’s “convergence” with
Choudhry’s “universalism”, similarly using Tushnet’s “expressivism” to
encompass Jackson’s “engagement” and “resistance” and Choudhry’s
“genealogical” and “dialogical” modes, and “pragmatism” to include Tushnet’s
“bricolage.”
49

Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 192
(2003).
50
Mary Ann Glendon, Judicial Tourism: What’s Wrong with the U.S. Supreme Court
Citing Foreign Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A14.
51
H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263 (1987).
52
Methodologically, the benefits and disadvantages of the case study are well-known.
The case study provides a useful object to apply ideas and methods that have developed
through other theoretical and empirical work. It is most useful when the line is not clearly
evident between the phenomena being studied—in this case, constitutional borrowing—and
the context in which that phenomena occurs, the judicial interpretation. The case study,
however, cannot establish conclusions that are general or reliable. Notwithstanding these
limitations, case studies are abundant in social and natural sciences literature and remain
central to business, public policy, and the related form of the case method in legal education in
the United States. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Teaching Civil Procedure Through Its Top
Ten Cases, Plus or Minus Two, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 115–17 (2003) (summarizing the
case method in legal education); Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad:
Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
731, 754–57 (2003) (discussing the usefulness of case studies as a vehicle for analyzing legal
problems).
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Universalist Interpretation

Constitutional courts invoke “universalism” when their decisions assert
that constitutional rights are cut from a universal cloth of rights and
obligations.53 Constitutional courts are “engaged in the identification,
interpretation, and application of the same set of principles.”54 The exact legal
structures and procedures may differ, but most legal systems nevertheless share
underlying principles. And constitutional courts are particularly suited to
secure those principles to all citizens.55 “[E]very legal system in the world is
open to the same questions and subject to the same standards, so that when
systems do differ, it is often the result of historical accident or temporary or
contingent circumstances.”56
Because constitutions and their highest
interpretive bodies face problems common to all societies, those societies may,
at the very least, develop a common vocabulary and set of theoretical
concepts.57 Roger Alford analogizes universalism to the natural law tradition
in which principles of equality, justice, and liberty are ultimately traceable to a
limited number of divine virtues.58
Recent scholarly discussions have focused on the use of universalist
interpretation in cases involving the extent of the state’s ability to punish
crimes by depriving citizens of their lives.59 Universalist interpretation uses
the reasoning and precedent of foreign jurisdictions in order to identify norms
and principles operating in constitutional republics, viewing those precedents

53

See Miguel González Marcos, Comparative Law at the Service of Democracy: A
Reading of Arosemana’s Constitutional Studies of the Latin American Governments, 21 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 259, 317 (2003). The debate about whether there can or should be a universal human
code remains heated, although it is assumed for purposes of this argument that a set of
universal human values is realizable and desirable. See Rushworth M. Kidder, Universal
Human Values: Finding an Ethical Common Ground, FUTURIST, July–Aug. 1994, at 8, 8–13.
54
Choudhry, supra note 6, at 833.
55
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986).
56
Choudhry, supra note 6, at 834.
57
Id.
58
Alford, supra note 4, at 663 (“As late as 1829 the Court could declare the natural
law pronouncement that ‘[t]he fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that
the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.’”) (citing Wilkinson
v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829)).
59
See EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2002) (referring to the interpretation of, for example,
dignity, in courts in countries like Germany, Israel, and South Africa, which have
simultaneously claimed that such a right is universal while reaching different conclusions as to
its meaning and breadth); Dixon, supra note 3, at 951; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 187, 195 (2007). The degree of
“universalism” is highly dependent on the description and nature of the right at issue. Baruch
Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in Israel: The Impact on Administrative
Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581 (2001); Lombardi & Brown, supra note 32, at 420.
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as evidence of deeper currents of a universal rule of law.60 In Ferreira v.
Levin, South Africa’s Justice Ackermann summarized comparative
interpretation as exploring “our own common law as well as the common law
in other jurisdictions . . . . in the context of an ‘open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality’ . . . ‘to promote the values which underlie’
precisely such a society.”61 In these cases, reflective of a much larger body of
comparative decisions, judges openly attempt to “discover” the features of a
universal, common set of citizens’ rights.62
Universalism enjoys positive as well as normative justifications.
According to Jeremy Waldron, judges relying on foreign precedent may,
through an iterative process, achieve a consensus, or some version of
uniformity on fundamental principles or interpretations of those principles.63
The greater the degree of agreement, the more likely the grounds of agreement
are to be correct or at least deserving of substantial consideration. Striking
down the juvenile death penalty in the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, invoked the practice of
examining “the laws of other countries and to international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”64 In their historical analysis of U.S.
Supreme Court reference to foreign law, Steven Calabresi and Stephanie
Zimdahl argue that this utilitarian approach has subtly underscored decades of
American constitutional interpretation.65 U.S. Supreme Court justices refer to

60

As Jackson notes, sometimes these uses are explicitly or implicitly invited. Jackson,
Transnational Discourse, supra note 4, at 290–92 (citations omitted) (“Some constitutions
specifically or implicitly authorize consideration of foreign or international law in the
resolution of constitutional rights questions. The South African Constitution specifically
provides that ‘[W]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court . . . must consider international
law; and . . . may consider foreign law,’ and the South African Court has done both on a
number of occasions. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that the constitutional
mandate to consider international human rights law ‘would include nonbinding as well as
binding law,’ an interpretation by no means obvious though apparently accepted as correct. In
addition to provisions specifically authorizing the consideration of foreign law, clauses like
Canadian Charter Section 1, permitting only those limitations of rights demonstrably justified
in a ‘free and democratic’ society, implicitly invite consideration of the practices of other
democratic nations. Similar language is found in some provisions of the ICCPR and of the
regional human rights conventions.”).
61
Ferreira v. Levin & Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at 111 para. 91 (S. Afr.) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
62
Amnon Reichman, The Passionate Expression of Hate: Constitutional Protections,
Emotional Harm and Comparative Law, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 76, 136 (2007); Kai
Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 331, 420–21 (1998).
63
See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV.
129 (2005).
64
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
65
Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005).
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foreign law to confirm their reasoning based initially and principally on the
U.S. Constitution and prior Court precedent.
B.

Expressivist Interpretation

Expressivist comparative constitutional law does not expound
“universal” values underlying legal systems.
Examination of foreign
jurisprudence may nevertheless provide a useful source by which to criticize,
evaluate, and more fully understand one country’s own legal system. 66 This
“dialogical” or “expressive” use of comparative jurisprudence “exposes the
practices of one’s own legal system as contingent and circumstantial, not
transcendent and timeless.”67
Comparing legal systems and rules,
constitutional adjudicators may not discover universal values like those of the
“open and democratic society” but will nevertheless discover the essential
underpinnings of their own constitutional framework and, subsequently, more
effectively decide crucial constitutional questions in light of that
understanding.68 Expressive interpretation is used more frequently and applies
to a broader set of rights than “universalist” interpretation including
affirmative action, copyright, and the right to education or health.69

1. Expressivism and the Constitutional Reflection of
Culture
U.S., Canadian, and European constitutional courts, for example, have
engaged in expressive interpretation to reach varying conclusions as to the
protections that individuals enjoy as to free speech and expression. Consider
the example of hate speech. In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional the following Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance passed by the
city of St. Paul, Minnesota:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not
66

See also Annus, supra note 5, at 314 (alternatively referring to dialogical interpretation
as the “soft use of comparative experience”).
67
Choudhry, supra note 6, at 836.
68
See Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L
L. 409, 424–27, 437–39 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1103 (2000) (discussing the emergence of a global legal community through judicial
dialogue). But see McCrudden, supra note 7 (expressing skepticism about the value of
transnational discussions or comparative reasoning in the area of human rights).
69
See Annus, supra note 5, at 305 (citations omitted) (“A third [area of comparative
constitutional law] focuses on substantive constitutional law issues, and compares approaches
by different countries, or otherwise reviews the solutions of one country from an ‘outsider’
perspective or for an outside reader. Such issues are very diverse, and have ranged from free
speech to affirmative action.”). See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows
or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.70
St. Paul convicted a teenager, R.A.V., after he burned a cross on the
lawn of an African-American family. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
the conviction on the basis that burning the cross incited violent behavior
within the scope of a long-established exception to the free speech protections
afforded by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.71 The U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed and determined that the ordinance violated the First
Amendment because the breadth of the ordinance might prohibit “otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.” 72 In
other words, the American right to free expression was to be largely free of
government interference—any hint that protected free speech may be
endangered was sufficient to invalidate government regulation. The St. Paul
decision became the paradigmatic case of the American approach to free
speech—fear that the state was given too much discretion dominated the
Court’s analysis.73
Relying in part and distinguishing in part the reasoning of the U.S.
Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,74 the Supreme Court of Canada reached a
different conclusion as to protected speech. In R. v. Keegstra, the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the conviction of James Keegstra for violating the
“Hate Propaganda” provision of the Canadian Criminal Code, which
prohibited communications that “willfully promote[] hatred against any
identifiable group . . . .”75 An Alberta trial court convicted Keegstra, a high
school teacher, based on his teachings attributing “various evil qualities to
Jews.”76 After reviewing the “reasonable limits” imposed on the rights and
freedoms contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the
Supreme Court of Canada addressed “a . . . crucial [matter] to the disposition
of this appeal: the relationship between Canadian and American approaches to
the constitutional protection of free expression, most notably in the realm of
hate propaganda.”77 Ultimately concluding that “Canada’s constitutional
vision depart from that endorsed in the United States,”78 the Supreme Court of
70

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
The “fighting words” exception was established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
72
St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 381.
73
Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of SelfRestraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 27 (2003).
74
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
75
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, C-46, § 319(2) (Can.).
76
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
77
Id.
78
Id.
71
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Canada nevertheless cited U.S. Supreme Court decisions as “evidence of a
recognition that content discrimination is sometimes accepted.”79 The decision
made extensive use of expressive interpretation—the justices explored not only
similarities but differences with American constitutional law in sharpening the
Canadian experience with free speech and the wider berth given to Canadian
provincial governments to regulate it.
Similarly, Judge Bonello of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) concurred in Ceylan v. Turkey80 but rejected the test favored by the
ECHR in favor of the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schenck
v. United States.81 Munir Ceylan was a Turkish national who, while president
of the petroleum workers’ union (Petrol-İş Sendikasi), wrote an article entitled
“The Time Has Come for the Workers to Speak Out—Tomorrow It Will Be
Too Late” in the July 21–28, 1991, issue of Yeni Ülke (New Land), a weekly
newspaper published in Istanbul.82 The Turkish government brought a
criminal action against Ceylan in the Istanbul National Security Court resulting
in his conviction under Article 312, sections 2 and 3 of the Turkish Criminal
Code for inciting the people to hostility and hatred by making distinctions
based on ethnic or regional origin or social class.83 He was sentenced to one
year and eight months’ imprisonment and a substantial fine. 84 The European
Court of Human Rights determined that the “pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness” of a democratic society required freedom of expression, as
did an individual’s self-fulfillment.85 Any exceptions to such freedom must be
strictly construed, and political speech was particularly protected unless such
speech were “incite[ment] to violence.”86 Judge Bonello, regarding the
Court’s formulation as insufficiently broad, argued instead for an imminence
requirement—by and large the only distinction between the European Court of
Human Rights formulation and the American one.87
In these expressive experiences, courts sharpen constitutional
similarities and differences in the context of a given cultural, political, and

79

Roy Leeper, Keegstra and R.A.V.: A Comparative Analysis of the Canadian and U.S.
Approaches to Hate Speech Legislation, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 295, 306 n.76 (2000) (citing
Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 742; Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
(commercial speech); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(political speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity)).
80
Ceylan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999).
81
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
82
Ceylan, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, ¶ 8.
83
Id. ¶¶ 9–11.
84
Id. ¶ 11.
85
Id. ¶ 32(i).
86
Id. ¶ 34.
87
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
376 (1927); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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economic context.88 The expansive reach of free speech in the United States is
deemed too broad in the Canadian context and misformulated in the European
context, which emphasizes free speech as a positive right needed for selffulfillment. Discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times
v. Sullivan,89 the South African Constitutional Court refused to adopt
“horizontal application”—that private parties may invoke constitutional
protections in their private law disputes—because of the important appellate
“division of labor” established by South African Constitutional framers.90 The
expressive mode emphasizes “constitutional difference . . . . [A] constitution is
only unique by comparison to other constitutions that share some feature or
characteristic which that constitution does not.”91
2. Expressivism as Divergence from Sibling Constitutional
Traditions
Historical relationships and adopted legal structures and traditions can
“offer sufficient justification to import and apply entire areas of constitutional
doctrine.”92 “Constitutions tied together by genealogy are related either like
parent and child, or like siblings who have emerged from the same parent legal
system.”93 Borrowing constitutional jurisprudence from “sibling” legal
systems takes as its starting point a shared set of moral-political values, which,
in turn, can borrow from one another legitimately. 94 This kind of borrowing
takes as its approximate parallel Burkean traditionalism, in which longstanding, common norms and practices justify sisterhood of legal and political
systems, even without concerted efforts to guard those legal systems from
internal or external challenges.95

88

Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (2006) (exploring the limitations and possibilities of comparative
constitutional adjudication in the Australian context).
89
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90
Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at 42 para. 57 (S. Afr.) (Kentridge, Acting
J.) (“The consequence would be that appeals in all [horizontal application] cases would lie to
the Constitutional Court, and the Appellate Division would be deprived of a substantial part of
what has hitherto been its regular civil jurisdiction.”).
91
Choudhry, supra note 6, at 856.
92
Id. at 838.
93
Id.
94
See Herman Schwartz, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law, 10 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 10 (2003) (arguing that the phenomenon is least developed in the United States, where it
faces significant opposition); Shawn E. Fields, Note, Constitutional Comparativism and the
Eighth Amendment: How a Flawed Proportionality Requirement Can Benefit from Foreign
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 963, 995–97 (2006). See also Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?:
Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357,
439 (2005).
95
See Jennifer M. Welsh, Edmund Burke and the Commonwealth of Europe: The Cultural
Bases of International Order, in CLASSICAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 173,
173–92 (Ian Clark & Iver B. Neumann eds., 1996).
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American courts regularly refer to British jurisprudence to interpret the
U.S. Constitution on the basis that the U.S. Constitution originated out of the
unique relationship between England and the American colonies immediately
before U.S. independence. In Loving v. United States, U.S. Army private
Dwight Loving was sentenced to death for murdering two taxicab drivers.96
Loving challenged his sentence on the basis that the President did not have the
power to prescribe aggravating factors, a power solely within Congress’s
purview.97 Relying on English legal history, Justice Kennedy argued that in
order to understand the power of Congress and the President in the context of
courts-martial, the U.S. Supreme Court must examine the comparative
constitutional law of England because of the relevance of Parliamentary
attempts to regulate military tribunals.98 Similarly, in District of Columbia v.
Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment
protected an individual’s right to bear arms, largely through reference to the
development of English law.99
Canadian judges have consistently looked to the practice of U.S. courts
with respect to the treatment of Native Americans. The common British
ancestry of the American and Canadian dealings with indigenous peoples and
the elaboration of those principles by Chief Justice John Marshall “is prima
facie relevant to the interpretation of the Canadian Constitution, in particular
Section 35(1)’s . . . affirmation of existing aboriginal rights; indeed, those
principles ‘are as relevant to Canada as they are to the United States.’”100
While common law and doctrines may shift, expressive interpretation
legitimizes the use of sibling legal doctrine as a source of constitutional
interpretation.101
C.

Pragmatist Interpretation

Courts engage in pragmatic borrowing to find “possible solutions to
similar problems at home.”102 Pragmatism therefore does not require, nor is it
generally affected by, incongruity between the national cultures or
96

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996).
Id. at 758.
98
David Fontana, Note, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV.
539, 550 (2001).
99
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 599 (2008) (“We reach the question, then:
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constitutional structures informing the foreign law that is borrowed. In Printz
v. United States,103 Justice Breyer, in his dissent, urged the Court to examine
the experiences of other federal political entities—Switzerland, Germany, and
the European Union—to inform whether local enforcement of federal gun
regulation better advanced the objective embodied in the Tenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution—namely, that the federal government’s lawmaking powers intrude to the least extent possible on local law-making and
enforcement prerogatives.104 Acknowledging that “there may be relevant
political and structural differences between their systems and our own,” Justice
Breyer nevertheless suggested that the establishment of a federal gun control
bureaucracy to enforce the Brady Act imposed greater impediments to “state
sovereignty or individual liberty” than Congress’s fairly modest requirement
for state officials to use “reasonable efforts” to implement the law.105 Justice
Breyer did not suggest that central commandeering of local officials to enforce
federal law was, in general, a necessary feature of constitutional, federal
republicanism (universalism) nor did he suggest that any fundamental aspect of
the U.S. Constitution required the Court to invalidate Congress’s allocation of
enforcement authority to state police (expressivism). Indeed, what he
proposed was a practical way to think through the problem posed by a law that
flowed from one of Congress’s enumerated powers with an aspect of
enforcement that, in his view, better balanced the federal-state balance
embodied in the Tenth Amendment than outright rejection.
In Miranda v. Arizona,106 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
custodial interrogations of criminal defendants were inherently coercive and
that this compulsion was in tension with the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on
self-incrimination.107 The Court imposed procedural requirements on police—
to inform subjects of custodial interrogation that they could remain silent, that
statements would be used as evidence against them, that they had a right to
counsel, and, if indigent, then counsel would be appointed—as part of a
judicially-fashioned remedy critical to the preservation of citizens’ Fifth
Amendment rights.108 The Court reviewed the law of coerced confessions
from England, Scotland, India, and Sri Lanka,109 which imposed varying levels
of protections to those in police custody.110 Noting that India’s Constitution
provided a similarly worded prohibition on self-incrimination, the Court
observed that confessions made to police officers were inadmissible in
criminal proceedings as substantive evidence against the accused, and
“confessions made to others while in police custody must be made in the
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immediate presence of a magistrate” to be admissible.111 Chief Justice Warren
noted that the Supreme Court of India had imposed an additional twenty-fourhour period between arrest and any confession to ensure time for the defendant
to deliberate on the confession.112 Although the Court referenced foreign law
principally for the purpose of showing that court-imposed procedures would
not overburden police, the U.S. Supreme Court opted for procedural
requirements closely mirroring those used in England at the time.113
There is, of course, no textual basis for the Miranda protections in the
Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
until formal criminal adversarial proceedings commence.114 Rather, the Court
struggled with the formation of a judicially administrable remedy given the
constitutional problem it had identified. The Miranda warnings, as we now
know them, were not the Court’s only option. The Court could have imposed
an absolute prohibition on the use of statements made in police custody as
evidence against a criminal defendant, consistent with practice in India.
Constitutional borrowing allowed the Court to survey a range of possible
remedies and identify those that balanced the value of statements made in
police custody as evidence and prosecution of crime with the “inherently
coercive” nature of custodial interrogations. Again, this choice was made
despite important structural and cultural differences between borrowing and
donating courts.
III.

SHRI D.K. BASU V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

While it inherited British language, political institutions, and, to some
extent, culture as a result of Britain’s long colonial presence, India separated
from the United Kingdom contemporaneously with, and influenced in
significant part by, the codification of universal human rights that had slowly
grown in number and detail over the course of the nineteenth century. The
Constitution of India reflected parliamentary norms under which British
democracy worked but adopted American principles of separation of powers
including a co-equal supreme court.115 It chose Australian and Canadian
principles of federalism to distribute sovereignty between the national and state
governments.116 Because of this history, Indian judges have long been
comfortable with constitutional borrowing. 117
111
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Factual and Procedural Posture

India’s geography and history have magnified the tensions nearly every
state experiences in balancing the role of securing order and geopolitical
security with the realization of at least a minimum core of citizens’ rights.118
At the time of its break with Britain, Indian citizens had suffered from longstanding and abusively deployed emergency laws passed and then
implemented with increasing severity as the independence movement gathered
momentum.119 The drafters of the Constitution of India sought to include
fundamental protections against the kinds of officially sanctioned abuses
prevalent under the British.120 Yet India was born into an extraordinarily
precarious security situation, surrounded along much of its land border by
actively hostile or latently antagonistic states that sponsored individual acts of
violence within both disputed and undisputed Indian territory. Internally, the
state persistently faced insurrections based on caste disparity or tribal identity.
According to Anil Kalhan:
India’s decades-long struggle to combat politicized violence has
created what one observer has termed a ‘chronic crisis of
national security’ that has become part of the very ‘essence of
[India’s] being.’ Thousands have been killed and injured in this
violence, whether terrorist, insurgent, or communal, and in the
subsequent responses of security forces.121
The Constitution of India, while guaranteeing fundamental rights, such
as speech, expression, assembly, association, and free movement, as well as
rights upon arrest, such as access to counsel, allows Parliament flexibility to
curtail those rights in the interests of the “sovereignty and integrity of India,”
the security of the state, or public order.122 In periods of declared emergency,
those rights may be suspended altogether.123 As a special report from the
Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York documented, many of the “exceptional” and emergency
measures put in place by the British have been reincorporated in laws and
118
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police procedures governing the rights of citizens in police custody.124 Indian
states, which enjoy general control over criminal investigation and
prosecution,125 continue to use these regulations against criminals, rebels, and
innocent parties.126 The human cost of these regulations has been severe.
India’s principal security entanglements have involved Pakistan, from
which it violently separated in 1947.127 Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan also
ruled the province of East Pakistan, which bordered the Indian province of
West Bengal.128 East Pakistan, separated from Pakistan by the entire state of
India, suffered economic, linguistic, and political marginalization.129 In 1970,
East Pakistan’s largest political party, the Awami League, won a sufficient
number of seats in national elections to form a government for West and East
Pakistan.130 West Pakistani military and political elites refused to allow the
League to do so and, combined with a lethargic response to a deadly cyclone in
East Pakistan in the same year, led to a war for independence.131 The war
began in March 1971 and lasted through December, when India intervened on
behalf of East Pakistan.132
East Pakistan became Bangladesh upon
independence.
The conflict sent millions across the border into the Indian state of
West Bengal, exacerbating the security problems for a state already struggling
with an indigenous movement to violently force the redistribution of property
to historically marginalized groups.133 Through 1974, the Indian state of West
Bengal detained 15,000 to 20,000 people without trial, some for five years or
more; eighty-eight died in police custody.134 D.K. Basu, Executive Chairman
124
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of Legal Aid Services of West Bengal, sent a letter to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court after several deaths in 1986 and recommended that the Court
“develop ‘custody jurisprudence’” and “formulate modalities for awarding
compensation.”135
The judiciary in India is comprised of an integrated court system that
administers justice for both the federal government and the states. In this
integrated court system, the Supreme Court of India is the highest and final
court of appeal. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction on issues of the
enforcement of civil and human rights.136 The Court treated D.K. Basu’s letter
as a “writ petition” invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction;137 another letter
followed from the Aligarh province detailing a death in police custody. 138
Taking notice of widespread allegations in all states, and the challenge of the
“national” issue of custody abuse and death, the Court issued notices to “all the
State Governments to find out whether they . . . desire[d] to say anything in the
matter.”139 While many states responded with, in the Court’s view,
unsatisfactory reassurances of procedures and safeguards, some contributed
specific recommendations, as did the Law Commission of India.140
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The Judgment

The judgment by Justice Anand was composed of two parts:
establishing procedural safeguards and elaborating a system of compensation
for victims of police abuse.141 The judgment emphasized first the global effort
against torture and its status as a special aim of international conventions and
declarations.142 In light of the unique role of police in efforts against torture,
Anand invoked the particular sections of the Constitution of India applicable to
forbidding torture, abuse, and lethal force in custodial detention.143 Article 21
provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.”144 Article 22 secures basic
rights of arrestees including rights to know reasons for detention and
immediate access to legal counsel.145 Despite constitutional protections, police
seeking to secure evidence and confessions failed to record arrests and
recharacterized detentions as “prolonged interrogation[s].”146
Instances have come to ou[r] notice where the police [have]
arrested a person without warrant in connection with the
investigation of an offence, without recording the arrest, and the
arrest[ed] person has been subjected to torture to extract
information from him for the purpose of further investigation or
for recovery of case property or for extracting confession etc.
The torture and injury caused on the body of the arrestee has
sometime[s] resulted [in] his death. Death in custody is not
generally shown in the records of the lock-up and every effort is
made by the police to dispose of the body or to make out a case
that the arrested person died after he was released from
custody.147
In the view of the Court, the difficulty in securing evidence against
police officers in detention circumstances meant that the only effective
safeguards would be those that facilitated procedural transparency and
accountability.148 Outlined in paragraph 36, the judgment imposed basic
measures of wearing plainly identifiable police credentials, recording arrests in
the presence of a family witness, informing of next of kin in case of arrest,
141
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reading of rights and warnings, availing detainees of physician services,
providing lawyers, and posting notices in police stations.149
The Court further expanded its powers to establish a compensatory
scheme for violation of constitutional rights—even though the Government of
India had expressly reserved against the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”)150 terms for compensation for victims of unlawful
arrest and the Indian Constitution conferred no such right. 151 Justice Anand
confirmed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not applicable in cases
where public servants violated constitutional rights, described actions for civil
damages as too burdensome, and appropriated the power to award monetary
damages in the court, “finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to
life” which may be “the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of
the family members of the . . . victim.”152
C.

Comparative Constitutional Adjudication

The Court analyzed foreign law, both judicial and legislative, in both
the procedural and compensatory parts of the judgment.
1. United Kingdom
Drawing upon the English experience, Anand suggested that the British
followed a similarly “progressive” path from permitting torture during
investigations, to strongly narrowing the power of the state when investigating
crimes.
The police powers of arrest, detention and interrogation in
England were examined in depth by Sir Cyril Philips’
Committee . . . . In regard to the power of arrest, the Report
recommended that the power to arrest without a warrant must
be related to and limited by the object to be served by the arrest,
namely, to prevent the suspect from destroying evidence or
interfering with witnesses or warning accomplices who have not
yet been arrested or where there is good reason to suspect the
repetition of the offence and not to every case irrespective of the
object sought to be achieved . . . . The power of arrest,
interrogation and detention has now been streamlined in
England on the basis of the suggestions made by the Royal
Commission . . . .153
149
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2. United States
The judgment further considered the balancing required where the
flexibility of the police to investigate and prevent crime and terrorism
conflicted with the ideals of a society protective of its civil liberties.
It is being said in certain quarters that with more and more
liberalisation and enforcement of fundamental rights, it would
lead to difficulties in the detection of crimes committed
by . . . hardened criminals . . . . The cure cannot, however, be
wors[e] than the disease itself.154
Citing Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that the police
power of the state was always limited by constitutionally guaranteed rights155:
A recurrent argument, made in these cases is that society’s need
for interrogation out-weighs the privilege. This argument is not
unfamiliar to this Court. . . . The who[l]e thrust of our
foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has
prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the
power of Government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment
that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against
himself. That right cannot be abridged.156
3. Ireland
Justice Anand’s opinion made more extensive use of foreign
constitutional law in exploring the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s ordering
monetary damages for violation of constitutional rights. The Court employed
Irish constitutional decisions for the authority that a constitutional court
enjoyed, the primary place of securing individual constitutional rights, citing
The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan,157
154
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It was not the intention of the Constitution in guaranteeing the
fundamental rights of the citizen that these rights should be set
at [n]ought or circumvented. The intention was that rights of
substance were being assured to the individual and that the
Courts were the custodians of those rights. As a necessary
corollary, it follows that no one can with impunity set these
rights at [b]ought or circumvent them, and that the Court’s
powers in this regard are as ample as the defence of the
Constitution requires.158
and that those rights deserved judicially created remedies, citing Byrne v.
Ireland,159
In several parts in the Constitution duties to make certain
provisions for the benefit of the citizens are imposed on the
State in terms which bestow rights upon the citizens and, unless
some contrary provision appears in the Constitution, the
Constitution must be deemed to have created a remedy for the
enforcement of these rights. It follows that, where the right is
one guaranteed by the State it is against the State that the
remedy must be sought if there has been a failure to discharge
the constitutional obligation imposed.160
4. Trinidad and Tobago
The Court further relied upon the decision of Maharaj v. Attorney
General of Trinidad and Tobago161 for the proposition that the remedy for
constitutional violations undertaken by the government or through the
omission of government action constituted a claim separate from normal civil
causes of action sounding in tort, e.g., false imprisonment.
An order for payment of compensation, [the Attorney General]
submitted, did not amount to the enforcement of the rights that
had been contravened. In their Lordships’ view an order for
payment of compensation when a right protected under Section
I ‘has been’ contravened is clearly a form of ‘redress’ which a
person is entitled to claim under Section 6(1) [of the
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago] and may well be the only
practicable form of redress . . . . The very wide powers to make
158
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orders, issue writs and give directions are ancillary to this. . . .
[The claim for monetary compensation for deprivation of liberty
otherwise than by due process of law] is a claim in public law
for compensation for deprivation of liberty alone.162
5. New Zealand
The Supreme Court of India finally relied upon a New Zealand Court
of Appeal case, which in turn employed constitutional decisions from the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and prior constitutional precedent from India. In
Simpson v. Attorney General [Baigent’s Case],163 the Court of Appeal
“considered the applicability of the doctrine of vicarious liability for torts like
unlawful search, committed by the police officials which violate the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act . . . .”164 The court observed that:
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act[,] unless it is to be no more
than an empty statement, is a commitment by the Crown that
those who in the three branches of the government exercise
[their] . . . duties will observe the rights that the Bill affirms. It
is[,] I consider[,] implicit in that commitment, indeed essential
to its worth, that the courts are not only to observe the Bill in
the discharge of their own duties but are able to grant
appropriate and effective remedies where rights have been
infringed. . . . Enjoyment of the basic human rights are the
entitlement of every citizen and their protection the obligation
of every civilized state. They are inherent in and essential to the
structure of society. They do not depend on the legal or
constitutional form in which they are declared. The reasoning
that has led the Privy Council and the Courts of Ireland and
India to the conclusions reached in the cases to which I have
referred . . . is . . . equally valid to the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act if it is to have life and meaning.165
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The court’s analysis of, and reliance upon, foreign decisions from
common law jurisdictions present an opportunity to test universalist,
expressivist, and pragmatist theories of comparative constitutional
adjudication. The Supreme Court of India used the decisions of American,
Irish, and New Zealand courts to demonstrate a common role for courts in
relation to the rights of the criminally accused and detained.166 The Court also
weighed differing approaches to measures of damages for constitutional
violations, including the ability of the state to seek contribution from officials
liable for those damages.
A.

Universalism: Freedom from Custodial Abuse

While the Supreme Court of India focused on a fundamental norm of
international human rights law and constitutional rights in India—the
prohibition on torture167—it used foreign law principally to emphasize the role
of courts “as custodian and protector of the fundamental and the basic human
rights of the citizens.”168 Justice Anand referred to Miranda v. Arizona for the
principle that the state’s interest in the security of its citizens (through arrest
and detention) was necessarily subordinate to constitutional enshrinement of
rights against self-incrimination.169 The precedent from Irish and New Zealand
courts—neither of which involved torture or custodial interrogation—went
much further.170
In The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan, the Supreme Court
of Ireland determined that an Irish inspector had, with the assistance of two
British policemen, conspired to deprive an Irish citizen of his right to challenge
the validity of a warrant for his arrest issued by an English court. 171 The case
brought to light a conflict between British law in effect before Irish
independence—mutual backing of warrants—and the Irish Constitution, which
granted a defendant the opportunity to contest the validity of the warrant.172
Justice Anand cited Ryan for the principle that the Supreme Court as the
166
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“custodians of [fundamental] rights” enjoyed “powers in this regard . . . as
ample as the defence of the Constitution requires.”173
In Baigent’s Case, the New Zealand police visited an incorrect address
specified on an otherwise valid warrant for the premises belonging to a
suspected drug dealer.174 The occupants informed the police that they had the
wrong address to which the police replied, “We often get it wrong, but while
we are here, we will have a look around anyway.”175 The residents of the
incorrectly designated address brought suit against the Attorney General for
negligence, trespass, abuse of process, and violation of their rights under New
Zealand’s newly adopted 1990 Bill of Rights Act, which prohibited
unreasonable searches and seizures.176 The common law torts were rejected by
the New Zealand High Court because of statutory immunities granted to police
when executing warrants.177 The New Zealand Court of Appeal—the name of
its highest court at that time—reinstated the trespass and abuse of process
claims because statutory immunities did not protect actions taken in bad
faith.178 More importantly, the Court of Appeal determined that, while the Bill
of Rights Act did not authorize money damages for violations—indeed, the
Court noted that Parliament had specifically rejected a draft of the Bill of
Rights Act that included a remedies provision—the Court could fashion a
remedy and hold the government liable for violations of rights specified in the
law. It is this latter authority—that courts are “not only to observe the Bill in
the discharge of their own duties but are able to grant appropriate and effective
remedies where rights have been infringed”—that the Supreme Court of India
emphasized with respect to a universal role for constitutional courts.179 The
173

Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 49. In 2001, after both D.K. Basu and Baigent’s
Case, the Irish Supreme Court cut back on the broad reading given to Quinn. In Sinnott v.
Minister of Education, the Court determined that:
[i]t is essential to read the passage [cited in D.K. Basu] in its context. So
read, it is clear that it is not an assertion of an unrestricted general power in
the judicial arm of government but rather a strong and entirely appropriate
statement that a petty fogging, legalistic response to an order in the terms of
Article 40.4 of the Constitution will not be permitted to obscure the realities
of the case, or to preclude appropriate action by the courts.
Sinnott v. Minister of Educ., [2001] 2 I.R. 545, 709 (Ir.).
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Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA).
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J.A. Smillie, The Allure of “Rights Talk”: Baigent’s Case in the Court of Appeal, 8
OTAGO L. REV. 188, 188 (1994).
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[Baigent’s Case] 3 NZLR 667, 691.
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Smillie, supra note 175, at 189 n.3 (noting the immunity extended by section 39 of the
1958 Police Act).
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Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L. REV. 205, 215 (2008) (“New
Zealand’s highest court held that the search did violate the bill of rights. In addition, it held
that the existing prohibition on damage remedies for public wrongs did not cover bill-of-rights
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New Zealand Court of Appeal, like the Supreme Court of India, relied on the
British Privy Council’s decision in Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad
and Tobago for the principle that the government could be held directly liable
for breaches of public law.180
Universalism conventionally emphasizes a substantive principle of
“transcendent” law “evinced by [its] presence in legal systems in other
countries.”181 In D.K. Basu, the relevant principle was a structural one
emphasizing the role of constitutional courts in ensuring the fundamental rights
of citizens. Indeed, in the view of the Supreme Court of India, referring to the
New Zealand Court of Appeal, that relationship “[did] not depend on the legal
or constitutional form in which [rights] are declared.”182 Emphasizing this role
was important because the Supreme Court of India not only substantially
lengthened the list of procedural requirements imposed on police upon
arresting a citizen but also ordered the availability of monetary compensation
when citizens’ rights were violated as a result.183 Before the Supreme Court’s
decision, the police were required not only to notify individuals arrested and
taken into custody of the charges against them but also to produce them before
a magistrate within twenty-four hours.184 The Supreme Court additionally
required that:
(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the
interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and
clear identification and name tags with their designations. The
particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation
of the arrestee insist be recorded in a register.
(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee
shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such
memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may be
either a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable
person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall
also be counter signed by the arrestee and shall contain the time
and date of arrest.
(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being
held in custody in a police or interrogation centre or other lockup, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other
person known to him or having interest in his welfare being
informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is
being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting
180
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witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a
relative of the arrestee.
(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee
must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative
of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the
Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of
the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12
hours after the arrest.
(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to
have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he
is put under arrest or is detained.
(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention
regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the
name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of
the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in
whose custody the arrestee is.
(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined
at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any
present on his/her bed, must be recorded at that time. The
“Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee and the
police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the
arrestee.
(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by
a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody
by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by
Director, Health Services of the concerned State or Union
Territory. Director, Health Services should prepare such a
penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well.
(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest,
referred to above, should be sent to the . . . Magistrate for his
record.
(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during
interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and
State Headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and
the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by
the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the
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arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on
conspicuous notice board.185
Justice Anand articulated, and relied upon, the proposition that a state is
responsible for the enforcement of its laws through the police but that the
violent methods and authority attaching to that responsibility give rise to two
“threats.” First, the police may accurately identify criminal suspects, but in the
process of collecting evidence or interrogating the suspect, the police will use
violent methods to coerce confessions.186 Second, the authority and violence
of the police, if not properly administered, may become an arm of local bosses
who use the state’s machinery to settle scores, intimidate ethnic or economic
rivals, and jeopardize faith in the rule of law.187 Yet the Supreme Court of
India did not use foreign precedent principally to support those assertions—
although Miranda v. Arizona certainly does. It instead used foreign precedent
to suggest that it is the courts’ role to strike that balance.
B.

Expressivism: Convergence and Divergence in Constitutional
Structure and Judicially-Ordered Remedies

Expressivist interpretation is fundamentally about courts exploring
foreign precedent in order to discover and explain constitutional difference.
Expressivism requires at least three procedural steps: identifying underlying
assumptions of foreign jurisprudence, analyzing differences between those
assumptions and “domestic assumptions,” and sharpening constitutional
provisions as a matter of historical and social circumstances shaping the
deciding court’s constitution.188
Citing relevant Irish precedent, the Court noted that “Ireland, which has
a written constitution, guaranteeing fundamental rights . . . like the Indian
Constitution contains no provision of remedy for the infringement of those
rights.”189 Yet the Supreme Court of Ireland had fashioned remedies for
constitutional violations that imposed liability not only on wayward actors—
such as police acting on a knowingly invalid warrant—but on the state itself
for “failure to discharge the constitutional obligation imposed.”190 In Byrne v.
Ireland, the Supreme Court of Ireland determined that the government’s
sovereign immunity had not survived the drafting of the 1937 Constitution,
185

Id. at para. 36. See also Kalhan et al., supra note 115, at 117 (“In its landmark case of
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which specified certain immunities belonging to the President and members of
the Oireachtas, Ireland’s parliament.191
Katherine Byrne’s suit was fairly pedestrian, so far as it goes. She fell
on a public walkway after employees from Ireland’s Department of Posts and
Telegraphs failed to effectively fill a trench, causing a subsidence of the path
on which Ms. Byrne stumbled.192 But her ability to sue the state for damages
in tort implicated Ireland’s sovereign immunity and thus the courts’ ability to
fashion remedies for violations of constitutional rights. If sovereign immunity
barred her action, it barred actions against the state for other violations as well.
This distinction had emerged in Indian jurisprudence, although it was
treated differently. While Justice Anand conceded that the sovereign immunity
defense might obtain for actions in tort, it did not provide a defense against
violations of fundamental rights:
In this context it is sufficient to say that the decision of this
Court in Kasturilal upholding the State’s plea of sovereign
immunity for tortious acts of its servants is confined to the
sphere of liability in tort, which is distinct from the State’s
liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the
application in the constitutional scheme and is no defence to the
constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution which enables award of fundamental rights, when
the only practicable mode of enforcement of the fundamental
rights call be the award of compensation.193
Without this distinction, he wrote, the law “relegat[ed] the aggrieved to
the remedies available in civil law, limit[ing] the role of the courts too much,
as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens.”194
The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of
the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people
and expected to respond to their aspirations. A Court of law
cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities.
191

Byrne v. Ireland, [1972] I.R. 241, 264–66 (Ir.) (Walsh, J.). This is apparently a
controversial point in Irish constitutional law. Ireland’s 1937 Constitution contained a specific
provision to carry over prerogatives from the Irish Free State (1922–1937). Id. at 271 (citing
Article 73 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State). To reconcile that provision with its
ultimate conclusion, the Court determined that the Irish Free State Constitution had not carried
over the prerogatives from when Ireland was part of the United Kingdom. Id. at 271–74.
Because the prerogatives did not exist under the Irish Free State, the provision in the 1937
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explanatory note to Professor Oran Doyle.
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Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to
the family of the victim—civil action for damages is a long
drawn and cumbersome judicial process. 195
To support this conclusion, Justice Anand relied on the Judicial
Committee of the U.K. Privy Council interpreting Section 6 of the Trinidad
Constitution.196 That section provided that “without prejudice to any other
action with respect to the same matter which is available . . . apply to the High
Court for redress.”197 A majority of the Judicial Committee determined that
the provision authorized the availability of a remedy for breaches of
fundamental rights that sounded not in tort (vicarious liability for the acts of
government agents) but in a direct action against the state for a violation of
public law.198
The justifications that the Supreme Court of India identified for its
broad remedial powers fit within the “expressivist”, “dialogical”,
“engagement”, and “bricolage” modes of constitutional interpretation. While
Justice Anand did not emphasize the common legal heritage shared by the
courts from which he borrowed, elsewhere in the opinion he hinted at the
relevance of systems derived from British judicial institutions. His reference
to foreign law began with early English tolerance of torture and forced
confessions and British progress toward enlightened practices (based, in part,
on Canadian experience).199 He referred only to legal authorities that shared
British judicial heritage.200
While India’s Constitution reflected a separate national experience—he
noted the Court’s willingness to uphold preventive detention measures based
on India’s security situation—he identified constitutional similarities and
differences that nevertheless imparted broad remedial powers to courts to
protect fundamental rights.201 Ireland and India, unlike New Zealand or the
United Kingdom, decided cases according to a written constitutional
tradition.202 Although they diverged on the issue of the applicability of
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sovereign immunity to tort suits, they shared a tradition of court-fashioned
remedies for violations of constitutional rights.203
C.

Pragmatism: Defining the Limits of Money Damages as
Remedy for Civil Rights Violations

Faced with a number of victims of police abuse across India and only
prospectively imposed procedures for ensuring their rights, the Supreme Court
of India also grappled with what remedy, if any, it could grant retrospectively.
The Court determined that mere judicial acknowledgment of the wrongs “does
not by itself provide any meaningful remedy” to victims of custodial
violence204—nor, in the Court’s view, did statutory provisions of the India
Penal Code, which regulated police who violated detainees’ rights.205 Justice
Anand acknowledged that India had reserved against Article 9(5) of the
ICCPR—which requires that victims of unlawful arrest or detention “have an
enforceable right to compensation”206—and the Constitution of India provided
no express authority to grant compensation.207
While the Court located its authority to fashion remedies in its basic
structural role of protecting fundamental rights, the amount of damages was
less clear. The courts of India, like courts elsewhere, had first struggled with
whether courts enjoyed any right to award money damages, a power that
implicated legislative prerogatives.208 Even if a court concluded, as many had,
that an order to pay money damages was within the power of the court to
remedy violations of constitutional rights, they next grappled with the
appropriate measure, often noting the difficulty in analogizing to tort
equivalents.209 This may in part explain Justice Anand’s reference to Maharaj
v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago.210
In Maharaj, a trial court judge cited a barrister of the Trinidad and
Tobago bar for contempt of court based on a vague and otherwise unexplained
“vicious attack on the integrity of the Court.”211 Maharaj ordered the attorney
to serve seven days’ imprisonment.212 Under the law of Trinidad and Tobago
at the time, the attorney had no right to appeal a contempt order to the Trinidad
and Tobago Court of Appeal and could only appeal to the Judicial Committee
203

Id.
Id. at para. 41.
205
Id. at para. 42.
206
ICCPR, supra note 150, at art. 5.
207
Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 43.
208
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)) (“The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.”).
209
Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at paras. 44–47.
210
Maharaj v. Att’y Gen. of Trin. & Tobago, [1979] A.C. 385.
211
Id. at 391.
212
Id. at 390–91.
204

109

110

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2013

of the United Kingdom Privy Council (the highest court of appeal for Trinidad
and Tobago) with special leave.213
While the attorney did pursue that route, the attorney also brought an
original suit against Maharaj and the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
for violation of his constitutional right “not to be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law.”214 Section 6 of the Constitution, at the time,
provided:
[W]ithout prejudice to any other action with respect to the same
matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the
High Court for redress. . . . The High Court shall have original
jurisdiction . . . and may make such orders, issue such writs and
give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the
purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of
[constitutional rights] . . . .215
The plaintiff requested a declaration that the order committing him to
prison for contempt was unconstitutional and illegal, that he be immediately
released from custody, and that damages be awarded him against the Attorney
General “for wrongful detention and false imprisonment.”216 The second trial
judge who heard the motion refused jurisdiction, arguing that to hear the
complaint would in effect be an exercise of appellate review over the initial
contempt order.217 When the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council finally
heard his appeal from the initial contempt order, it determined that the court
had violated his right to contest the charges against him.218 On appeal from the
second action, the Judicial Committee determined that the state owed him
monetary compensation for the loss of his liberty because he had already
served his seven days.219 “The contravention was in the past; the only
practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.”220 In order to reach
that conclusion, the Committee liberally interpreted “redress” within the
meaning of Section 6.221
The Judicial Committee distinguished a tort action for false
imprisonment principally on the basis of damages:
The claim is not a claim in private law for damages for the tort
of false imprisonment, under which the damages recoverable
are at large and would include damages for loss of reputation. It
213
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is a claim in public law for compensation for deprivation of
liberty alone. Such compensation would include any loss of
earnings consequent on the imprisonment and recompense for
the inconvenience and distress suffered by the appellant during
his incarceration.222
The Committee noted that these damages were available from the state directly
and not the trial judge personally, a finding that was important to preserve the
“long established rule of public policy that a judge cannot be made personally
liable in court proceedings for anything done by him in the exercise or
purported exercise of his judicial functions.”223
[N]o change is involved in the rule that a judge cannot be made
personally liable for what he has done when acting or
purporting to act in a judicial capacity. The claim for redress
under section 6 (1) for what has been done by a judge is a claim
against the state for what has been done in the exercise of the
judicial power of the state. This is not vicarious liability; it is a
liability of the state itself. It is not a liability in tort at all; it is a
liability in the public law of the state, not of the judge himself,
which has been newly created by section 6 (1) and (2) of the
Constitution.224
In Maharaj, the Judicial Committee noted that the plaintiff did not request, and
therefore it did not pass upon, whether punitive damages were available for
violations of constitutional rights.225
Justice Anand adapted this regime from the Maharaj case. The Privy
Council determined in Maharaj that a plaintiff in a constitutional rights case
enjoyed a right to compensation from the state for a violation of public law but
barred any resort that the plaintiff or the state might have to the individual
perpetrator of the constitutional violation.226 Thus, a trial judge might violate a
party’s (or attorney’s) rights but would not be individually liable for
compensation paid to compensate the victim. By contrast, the Supreme Court
of India determined that courts could award victims compensatory, but not
punitive, damages (the Maharaj court reserved ruling on the possibility of
punitive damages in constitutional cases), but the state would enjoy a right of
indemnification against the “wrong-doer.”227 Moreover, damages awarded for
222
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violation of a constitutional right were in addition to, not in place of, any tort
remedies available to a plaintiff, although the State could, under certain
circumstances, offset any award of damages for a constitutional violation with
an award obtained in a tort suit.228
V.

D.K. BASU V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AS POLITICAL DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Shri D.K. Basu therefore
confirms the basic soundness of current categorization and classification
schemes for constitutional borrowing as articulated by Choudhry, Jackson,
Tushnet, and others.229 But what about the more fundamental concern that
judges, in the course of borrowing constitutional precedent, are not just wisely
consulting a useful body of persuasive authority but are, in fact, using foreign
precedent to enhance or establish the law-making powers of the judiciary?
In D.K. Basu, there are two principal actions which might support
critics’ concerns. First, each principle of foreign constitutional law cited by
Justice Anand is used to expand the remedial and structural powers of the
Supreme Court of India. Anand cited Miranda v. Arizona for the nonderogability of the rights of criminal detainees,230 Irish constitutional precedent
reserving to the Supreme Court “powers [to remedy violations of rights] . . . as
ample as the defence of the Constitution requires,”231 Trinidadian precedent to
establish that plaintiffs could resort immediately to the Supreme Court for
relief instead of pursuing tort actions against state officers,232 and New Zealand
precedent for the extraordinary conclusion that the rights of criminal detainees
wrong doer. In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory
and not on [the] punitive element. The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to
punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence
(irrespective of compensation) must be fell to the criminal courts in which the offender is
prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound to do. The award of compensation in the
public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damage
which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the
same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State. The quantum of
compensation will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no strait, jacket
[sic] formula can be evolved in that behalf. The relief to redress the wrong for
the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law
jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies and not in derogation of them. The
amount of compensation as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress the wrong
done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the
claimant by way of damages in a civil suit.”).
228
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229
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framers of the United States Constitution had provided for a safeguard against a ‘failure of
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are human rights that “do not depend on the legal or constitutional form in
which they are declared.”233 Thus, the Supreme Court of India appropriated to
itself the ability to identify, regulate, and redress wrongdoing by state police
officials and their agents. Similarly, it appeared able to do so as a function of
universal human rights and not, it would seem, by other constitutional or legal
constraints.
A.

The Accumulation of Structural-Expansionist Precedent
From Maharaj to Baigent’s Case

Second, D.K. Basu represented the accumulation and mutuallyreinforced legitimacy of structural-expansionist precedent drawn from widely
disparate constitutional and factual contexts. The principle that courts must
define and enforce procedural and monetary remedies for violations of
constitutional rights migrated from the Trinidadian case of Maharaj in the civil
contempt context to Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, a 1993 Supreme Court
of India decision on custodial death,234 to one of several additional precedents
used (including Nilabati Behera) by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
Baigent’s Case (in the search and seizure context), all of which the Supreme
Court of India used again in D.K. Basu.
In Nilabati Behera, the Supreme Court of India ordered the payment of
monetary compensation for the custodial death235 of Nilabati Behera’s son,
Suman Behera.236 Suman was a twenty-two-year-old male arrested on
suspicion of theft and detained by the police at 8 a.m. on December 1, 1987.237
Thirty hours later, Suman’s mother learned that her son’s dead body had been
found by nearby train tracks.238
Suman’s mother brought an action based on the theory that custodial
death amounted to a violation of Suman’s Article 21 constitutional right to
life.239 After considering relatively objective medical evidence to reject police
assertions that Suman escaped and was struck by a passing train, 240 the Court
233
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The Record of 50 Years of Constitutional Practice, 12 STUDENT ADVOC. 4, 10 (2000).
240
Nilabati Behera, 2 S.C.C. 746, at para. 8. Evidence was produced before the district
judge from a medical examiner that indicated that Suman’s injuries were caused by blunt
objects and that he received them ante-mortem. Id. Thus, this evidence “exclude[d] the
possibility of all the injuries to Suman Behera being caused in a train accident while indicating
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analyzed whether or not it had the authority to provide compensation for the
deprivation of a fundamental right. In order for the Court to reach its decision,
it relied on domestic,241 foreign, and international human rights authority.242
The Court in Nilabati Behera used Maharaj v. Attorney General of
Trinidad and Tobago for the same proposition as D.K. Basu (Justice Anand sat
on both panels): that violation of constitutional rights imparted a right for the
plaintiff to bring suit directly against the state for a breach of public law, not,
or at least not exclusively, on a theory based in tort or vicarious liability.243
The Court noted that in Maharaj, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
considered whether Section 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago,
excerpted above, permitted monetary compensation.244 The state’s argument,
“that an order for payment of compensation did not amount to the enforcement
of the rights that had been contravened, was expressly rejected.”245 Instead,
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held “that an order for payment of
compensation, when a right protected had been contravened, is clearly a form
of ‘redress’ which a person is entitled to claim under Section 6, and may well
be ‘the only practicable form of redress’.”246 Justice Verma, who wrote the
opinion in Nilabati Behera, cited Maharaj for the proposition that
“enforcement of [a] constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of
compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention.”247
that all of them could result from the merciless beating given to him.” Id. In light of this
evidence, the police’s defense was viewed by the Court rather weakly based on several factors.
The police did not produce any evidence that Suman had escaped or that they had conducted a
search. Id. at para. 6. The Court also noted that the body was discovered by rail workers the
following morning, yet the police did not arrive nor take custody of the body until much later
in the day. Id. The Court seemingly inferred that if the police were worried about a custodial
escapee, they certainly did not act as though re-apprehending him was any sort of priority. See
id. Based on the facts, “[t]he burden [was] . . . clearly on the [police] to explain how Suman
Behera sustained those injuries which caused his death.” Id. at para. 4. The police agreed that
they would have been liable for depriving a person of his or her fundamental rights in their
custody; however, they simply denied depriving Suman of his fundamental rights. Id. at para.
5.
241
Chief among these sources was Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar. In Rudul Sah, the
Supreme Court of India determined that it had the authority to allow compensation for the
deprivation of a fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, stating that
“respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State
must repair the damage done by its officers to [a] petitioner’s rights. It may have recourse
against those officers.” Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 3 S.C.R. 508, 514 (India).
242
Besides the Maharaj case, which will be discussed in length above, the Nilabati Behera
Court references Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
Nilabati Behera, 2 S.C.C. 746, at para. 21 (“Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”). See also ICCPR, supra
note 150.
243
Nilabati Behera, 2 S.C.C. 746, at paras. 15–17 (citing Maharaj v. Att’y Gen. of Trin. &
Tobago, [1979] A.C. 385).
244
Id. at para. 15.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id. at para. 16.
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Simpson v. Attorney General [Baigent’s Case] relied upon both
Maharaj and Nilabati Behera to extend the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s
ability to order relief for violations of rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights
Act.248 The New Zealand Court of Appeal broadened the Crown’s liability for
the violation of civil rights (the aforementioned illegal search of Mrs.
Baigent’s home under the strenuous objection of the family who alerted the
police to the inaccuracy of the warrant).249 The Court outlined three ways the
Crown could be liable for a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: 1)
“[i]t is an independent action against the Crown; 2) [i]t is an action in public
law, not tort law in any form; 3) [i]t is a strict liability action for contravention
of fundamental human rights.”250 The Baigent’s Court, quoting Lord Diplock
in Maharaj, stated:
Read in the light of the recognition that each of the highly
diversified rights and freedoms of the individual described in
section 1 already existed, it is in their Lordships’ view clear that
the protection afforded was against contravention of those rights
or freedoms by the state or by some other public authority
endowed by law with coercive powers. The chapter is
concerned with public law, not private law. . . . The claim for
redress under section 6(1) for what has been done by a judge is
a claim against the state for what has been done in the exercise
of the judicial power of the state. This is not vicarious liability;
it is a liability of the state itself. It is not a liability in tort at all;
it is a liability in the public law of the state, not of the judge
himself, which has been newly created by section 6(1) and (2)
of the Constitution [of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago].251
Lacking any explicit grant to remedy violations of its Bill of Rights
Act, like Section 6 of the Trinidad & Tobago Constitution, the Court of Appeal
cited Byrne v. Ireland, 252 State v. Ryan,253 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics254 for the general proposition that

248

Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 692, 700 (CA).
See id.
250
Melanie Smith, Note, Burgeoning Baigent?: A Critique of the Law Commission’s
Analysis of Baigent’s Case, 28 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 283, 285–86 (1998)
(footnotes omitted).
251
Baigent’s Case, 3 NZLR at 692 (quoting Maharaj v. Att’y Gen. of Trin. & Tobago,
[1979] A.C. 385, 396, 399) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252
Baigent’s Case actually referenced several cases from the Irish Supreme Court, but
Ryan and Byrne were the major influencing cases. See id. at 701–02.
253
The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan, [1965] I.R. 70 (Ir.).
254
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens, unlike the other cases referenced thus far, actually allows for suit to be
brought in private law. See id. at 397; see also Baigent’s Case, 3 NZLR at 702.
249
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courts must safeguard constitutional rights. 255 As J.A. Smillie noted, the
problem with the application of those precedents is that the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act “is not an entrenched supreme law like the Constitutions of
Ireland and the United States”; it was passed as an ordinary statute. 256 Indeed,
parliamentarians had considered and rejected judicially enforceable rights
under the Act.257 However, citing Nilabati Behera, the Court of Appeal
determined that limiting the plaintiffs to actions in tort improperly constrained
the fundamental role of courts in guaranteeing fundamental rights:
The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the
remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too
much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible rights of the
citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social
aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for
the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. . . . The
purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but
also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system
which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights.258
Based on American, Indian, and Irish precedent (albeit in starkly different
constitutional and factual contexts), the Baigent’s Court determined “that the
courts are the ultimate guardians of human rights and they must enforce those
rights regardless of Parliament’s intention.”259
The Baigent’s dissent made the point that the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act could be repealed at any time by a simple majority vote and
therefore lacked the equivalent democratic weight as fundamental constitutions
that provided specific and detailed mechanisms for amendment or change.260
Nevertheless, the Baigent’s Court concluded that “[t]he New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act, unless it is to be no more than an empty statement, is a
commitment by the Crown that those who in the three branches of the
government exercise its functions, powers and duties will observe the rights
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Baigent’s Case, 3 NZLR at 701 (quoting Byrne v. Ireland, [1972] I.R. 241, 264 (Ir.)
(Walsh, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“In several parts in the Constitution duties to
make certain provisions for the benefit of the citizens are imposed on the State in terms which
bestow rights upon the citizens and, unless some contrary provision appears in the
Constitution, the Constitution must be deemed to have created a remedy for the enforcement of
these rights. It follows that, where the right is one guaranteed by the State, it is against the
State that the remedy must be sought if there has been a failure to discharge the constitutional
obligation imposed. The Oireachtas cannot prevent or restrict the citizen from pursuing his
remedy against the State in order to obtain or defend the very rights guaranteed by the
Constitution in the form of obligations imposed upon the State.”).
256
Smillie, supra note 175, at 191.
257
Id. at 193–94.
258
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 746, at paras. 33–34 (India).
259
Smillie, supra note 175, at 197.
260
See id. at 190–91.
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that the Bill affirms.”261 The Bill of Rights Act surely implemented
obligations that New Zealand had undertaken in ratifying the ICCPR, so it
arguably represented the kind of fundamental rights for which the Irish and
U.S. Constitutions stood. However, the ICCPR itself gives states substantial
flexibility in implementing its provisions and by no means requires or
authorizes judiciaries to have the final say on enforcement.262
B.

From Baigent’s Case to D.K. Basu

The panel in D.K. Basu imported the accumulated precedent beginning
with Nilabati Behera in both establishing Miranda-like protections for
arrestees as well as a comprehensive regime for monetary compensation
should those protections be violated. It is entirely possible that the D.K. Basu
panel could have constructed the same regime based on its own precedent.
Indeed, as early as 1983, the Supreme Court of India signaled its potential
power to order compensation for breaches of Article 21 in Rudul Sah v. State
of Bihar, noting that “[o]ne of the telling ways in which . . . the mandate of
Article 21 [is] secured, is to mulct its violaters in the payment of monetary
compensation.”263 It had rejected state sovereign immunity in the context of
police assault in Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre v. Commissioner of
Police, Delhi,264 although Nilabati Behera and D.K. Basu are regarded as the
most important decisions establishing the Court’s constitutional basis for
awarding compensation for violations of Article 21.265 The Supreme Court of
India’s citation of foreign precedent may have served a signaling function that,
like other states in which the rule of law was well established, India would not
tolerate abuses in police custody.266
Another less flattering possibility is that Justice Anand duplicated,
without any significant analysis as to germaneness, the foreign precedent cited
in Baigent’s Case. Former Supreme Court of India Justice Ruma Pal used the
Fifth V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture to expose what she called the “seven
sins” of the Indian judiciary including “plagiarism and prolixity”:
If ‘independence’ is taken to mean ‘capable of thinking for
oneself’ then the fourth sin is plagiarism and prolixity. I club
the two together because the root cause is often the same
namely the prolific and often unnecessary use of passages from
text-books
and
decisions
of other
judges—without
261

Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 702 (CA).
See ICCPR, supra note 150, at art. 2, para. 2.
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Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 3 S.C.R. 508, 514 (India).
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Saheli, A Women’s Res. Ctr. v. Comm’r of Police, Delhi, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 513 (India).
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See REDRESS, RESPONSES TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE RIGHT TO REPARATION FOR TORTURE IN INDIA, NEPAL, AND SRI LANKA 24–25 (2003),
available at http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/IndianSeminarReport.pdf.
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See Naresh Mahipal, D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal, EXPERTSCOLUMN (Aug. 31,
2009), http://expertscolumn.com/content/dk-basu-vs-state-west-bengal.
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acknowledgment in the first case and with acknowledgment
in the latter. Many judgments are in fact mere compendia or
digests of decisions on a particular issue with very little original
reasoning in support of the conclusion.267
Yet Justice Anand’s use of foreign precedent was combined with prior
domestic precedent as part of a broader effort to show consensus among states
with legal systems in the British tradition and the similar practice among courts
in those jurisdictions of reserving for themselves the last say on the substance
of fundamental rights and the authority of courts, generally, to safeguard
them268:
[I]t is now a well accepted proposition in most of the
jurisdictions, that monetary . . . compensation is an appropriate
and indeed an effective and sometime[s] perhaps the only
suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of
the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants
and the State is victoriously liable for their acts.269
In some sense, this is exactly the way jurisprudence should, or at least
does, develop in what Anne-Marie Slaughter has referred to as “a global
community of courts.”270 In this context, constitutional courts may view
themselves as part of a consensus-building, rights-protecting regime that shares
features of the universalist and expressivist theories. Courts that engage in this
regime may adopt the same prima facie legitimacy of each other’s judgments.
In D.K. Basu, Justice Anand gives some evidence of this community, in that
the New Zealand Simpson court adopted foreign precedents, including an
earlier judgment of the Supreme Court of India on rights of detainees,271
which, in turn, serves as part of the justification for the result reached in D.K.
Basu. The court’s judgment thus derives from a legal regime composed of
constitutional courts.272
On one hand, there may be nothing particularly to worry critics of
comparative constitutional adjudication, given that D.K. Basu as well as the
New Zealand Court of Appeal interpreted their laws in light of national
obligations under the ICCPR. Even U.S. federal courts acknowledge that
looking at foreign precedent is part of ensuring the federal government’s

267

Justice Ruma Pal, 5th V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture: An Independent Judiciary
(Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://theradicalhumanist.com/index.php?option=com_radical&
controller=article&cid=431&Itemid=56.
268
See Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 23 (India).
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Id. at para. 56 (alteration in original).
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See Slaughter, supra note 49.
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Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 746 (India).
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See Choudhry, supra note 6, at 871.
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interest in uniform treaty interpretation.273 Moreover, courts read new civil
causes of action and remedies into existing constitutional and statutory regimes
with some frequency.
On the other hand, the process by which courts in India and New
Zealand used each other’s constitutional adjudication to expand their powers to
remedy police abuse and waive sovereign immunity for official misconduct
gives at least some evidence that constitutional borrowing may lead to an
additional source of law-making authority lacking the conventional attributes
of democratic law-making. It is true, as David Fontana has suggested, that
there is no shortage of comparative constitutional doctrine that might be used
to support principles of judicial restraint, rather than activism or even activism
consistent with “conservative” politics.274 Indeed, when the Supreme Court of
New Zealand (established in 2004 to be the new highest court of appeal) was
presented the opportunity to extend the rule in Baigent’s Case to judicial
violations of fundamental rights, it declined to do so. Justices McGrath and
Young, writing in the majority, emphasized the constitutional difference
between Trinidad and Tobago’s constitution relevant in Maharaj and cited the
U.S. Supreme Court case of Bradley v. Fisher275 for the impracticability of a
system allowing bad faith, gross negligence, or recklessness exceptions to a
broad doctrine of judicial immunity.276 Yet whatever the politics underlying
any given constitutional dispute, D.K. Basu and the precedent upon which it
was based appear to show another dimension to an already complex
countermajoritarian difficulty posed by judges with independent authority to
make or shape laws.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in D.K. Basu thus, by and
large, confirms current scholarly classification schemes for comparative
constitutional adjudication. The procedural and compensatory regime imposed
by the Court tracked a universalist interpretation of rights of criminally
accused and the role of courts in preventing the abuse of executive power in
the local enforcement of laws. The Supreme Court of India further engaged in
expressive interpretation in clarifying its own constitutional machinery and the
available remedial powers for the court as a part of that machinery.
Pragmatically, the Court could have adopted any of a number measures of
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See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, No. 08–645 (S. Ct. May 17, 2010), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-645.pdf.
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damages and indemnificatory possibilities with respect to individual states,
police officers, or other government agents.
Yet the judgment provides some grounds for critics’ concerns. While
the confrontation between civil liberties and the necessity of effective law
enforcement faces the vast majority of modern states, the role of the courts is
not necessarily a fixed one. D.K. Basu established or solidified the Supreme
Court of India’s role as a preeminent player in resolving that confrontation, a
role that may be problematic given India’s vast size and recurrent
insurrectionary activity. Indeed, the role of courts on that particular issue
necessarily involves historical context. Constitutional courts like South
Africa’s may engage in comparative jurisprudence in order to
“internationalize” their legal regimes to “affirm [their] membership in, or to
rejoin, the mainstream of international society.”277 Some South African
Constitutional Court judges have explicitly invoked this aim, as, for example,
did Justice Aharon Barak of Israel.278
Judges increasingly interacting with one another, facing common
challenges of interpretation and the ordering of rights, will almost inevitably
form important transnational linkages in which constitutional law becomes
“international” and for which it will become important to identify the practices
of constitutional courts, as both national and international actors. This Article
has shown not only that such a line might not be clear but also that the
principal concern now articulated by opponents of comparative constitutional
adjudication—that national judges will use foreign precedent to undermine
laws passed by legitimately elected legislators—is only one aspect of the
problem. Judges may increasingly view themselves as part of a law-making
community that includes, but is not limited to, their national role or selection.
That self-perception has important distributional consequences for internal
allocations of political power, given that popular checks on judiciaries often
lack the regularity and strength applied to legislators and executives.
Justice Anand appeared fairly unconcerned with this confrontation
between elected branches and the judiciary. In D.K. Basu, he quoted the
following from the 1949 Hamlyn Lecture by Sir Alfred Denning:
No one can suppose that the executive will never be guilty of
the sins that are common to all of us. You may be sure that they
will sometimes do things which they ought not to do: and will
not do things that they ought to do. But if and when wrongs are
thereby suffered by any of us what is the remedy? Our
procedure for securing our personal freedom is efficient, our
procedure for preventing the abuse of power is not. Just as the
pick and shovel is no longer suitable for the winning of coal, so
also the procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions on the
case are not suitable for the winning of freedom in the new age.
277
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They must be replaced by new and up-to date [sic] machinery,
by declarations, injunctions and actions for negligence. . . .
This is not the tasks [sic] of Parliament. . . . the courts must do
this. Of all the great tasks that lie ahead this is the greatest.
Properly exercised the new powers of the executive lead to the
welfare state; but abused they lead to a totalitarian state. None
such must even be allowed in this country.279
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